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Original Article
Long Lines at Polling Stations?
Observations from an Election Day Field Study
Douglas M. Spencer and Zachary S. Markovits*
ABSTRACT
This pilot study represents the first systematic attempt to determine how common lines are on Election
Day, at what times of day lines are most likely to form, what are the bottlenecks in the voting process,
and how long it takes an average citizen to cast his or her ballot. This study highlights the importance of
evaluating polling station operations as a three-step process: arrival, check-in, and casting a ballot. We
collected data during the 2008 presidential primary election in California, measuring the efficiency of the
operational components of 30 polling stations across three counties. We found statistically significant, and
meaningful, variation in the service rates of poll workers and voting technology. Our findings should better help election officials make critical decisions about the allocation of critical resources.
ble indication that something is wrong, yet little reliable information is available to explain the operational
inefficiencies that lead to lines at polling stations or
to guide policymakers in their choice of remedy.
Voters have long complained about standing in
line to vote, but in 2004 the issue became the subject of popular concern. In the presidential election
of 2004, long lines were reported in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida—some as long as ten hours.1 Several states responded to these reports with new early
voting rules. For example, in 2005, the Illinois General Assembly approved a bill that provided for inperson early voting at newly established vote centers.2 Later that year, Ohio’s General Assembly

INTRODUCTION

T

HE SUCCESS OF America’s electoral process hinges

on the performance of hundreds of thousands of
polling places housed in schools, churches, municipal
buildings, and neighbors’ garages. Local elections officials manage the poll workers whose task is to administer an efficient voting process. When this process breaks down, it is critical for these local officials
to both identify and solve whatever is wrong. Too often, election officials lack the data they need to effectively measure both what has gone wrong and how
a policy change will lead to better performance. As
an example, long lines at polling stations are a visi-

* Douglas M. Spencer is a researcher at the Survey Research
Center, University of California, Berkeley and a doctoral candidate at the UC Berkeley School of Law’s Jurisprudence and
Social Policy Program. Zachary S. Markovits is a Senior Associate, Election Initiatives, Pew Center on the States.
The authors presented a version of this paper at the 2009 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association on
April 2, 2009 in Chicago, IL. Portions of this research appeared
in “Dispatches from the Polls: A Case Study,” Electionline.org
Briefing, Washington, D.C. (2008), pp. 4–7.

1

M. Powell and P. Slevin, “Several Factors Contributed to
‘Lost’ Voters in Ohio,” Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
(December 15, 2004), p. A01.
2 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/19A-10. A 2006 Illinois State Board
of Elections pamphlet states that people vote early because
“they want to avoid long lines at the polling place on Election
Day.” See “Early Voting: No Reason Needed to Vote Early,”
http://www.elections.state.il.us/Downloads/ElectionInformation/PDF/EarlyVoting.pdf.
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passed a law allowing no-fault absentee voting.3 The
Utah legislature followed suit the next year with an
early voting law of their own.4 All of these laws
aimed to spread out the voting time in order to relieve polling place congestion on Election Day.
Despite these and other attempts to reduce the
waiting time for voters, long lines remained one
of the major problems reported by voters during
the 2008 election cycle. According to a recent
survey, 11% of respondents who did not vote in
the 2008 general election cited long lines as a major factor in their decision to stay home.5 That result suggests that long lines may have discouraged
up to 2.6 million people from voting.6 Among
those who braved long lines to vote, African
Americans were twice as likely to report standing
in line for more than half an hour than white or
Hispanic voters.7 These reports suggest that consequences of long Election Day lines are more serious than the mere inconvenience of standing on
one’s feet for several hours; there are strong reasons to seek a solution to this problem.
Unfortunately, there are few data on which to
base an explanation of the prevalence of lines at
polling stations. The data that do exist come from
post-election, self-reported interviews.8 To date,
nobody has physically monitored the inner-workings of polling stations to observe how their location, personnel, and organization affect the flow of
voter traffic, to measure the time it takes people to
vote, or to determine how these two variables are
related.
On February 5, 2008 we dispatched 119 data collectors to 30 California polling stations to collect
such data. This study represents the first systematic
attempt to determine how common lines are, at what
times of day lines are most likely to form, at what
point in the voting process lines form, and how long
it takes the average citizen to cast his or her ballot.
In addition to uncovering data about the voting process, our project also aims to establish a simple research design to guide future large-scale data collection projects.
Much of the field research on elections examines
activities that take place before elections, such as
voter registration and poll worker training, and relies on information that is available after the election, such as turnout and election results, but treats
the polling station as a black box. We capture data
related to voter arrivals, poll worker availability,
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voting machine operation, and the length of lines.
Our targeted independent variable is voting technology. We also analyze how various poll worker
characteristics affect the time it takes people to get
served at a polling station. This study departs from
prior research on elections by peering inside the
black box and focusing on the internal operation of
polling stations.
One major reason why polling place inefficiency has yet to be adequately studied is that
the administration of elections in the United
States is extremely complicated. Each state creates its own rules, budgets its own money, and
constructs its own election processes. In some
states, such as Wisconsin and Michigan, local jurisdictions have primary autonomy over election
administration. In others, such as Oklahoma and
Delaware, all election officials are state employees. Still others share administrative duties between state and local election officials. For example, in California, counties have significant
authority, yet they operate within a broad framework established by the Secretary of State. On the
federal level, the United States Constitution pre-

3

Sub. H.B. No. 234. During the 2006 general election, a thenrecord 15.3% of Ohio voters cast absentee ballots (up from
10.6% in 2004 under the old law). The Columbus Dispatch
quoted Matthew Damschroder, director of the Board of Elections in Franklin County, where nearly 25% of voters cast absentee ballots, as attributing the increase in absentee voting to
“lingering memories of the long lines at many county polling
stations in . . . 2004.” See M. Niquette, “Voting law made few
big waves,” The Columbus Dispatch, Columbus, Ohio (December 17, 2006).
4 Utah Election Code 20A-3-601, amended by Chapter 256,
2007 General Session.
5 M. Alvarez, S. Ansolabehere, A. Berinsky, T. Hall, G. Lenz,
and C. Stewart, “2008 Survey of the Performance of American
Elections—Final Report” (Boston 2009), p. 36 (see Table III3), http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/node/231.
6 Id., at 59.
7 Id., at 38. 29% of black voters reported standing in line for
more than thirty minutes compared to 14% of white voters and
15% of Hispanic voters.
8 While exit polling usually is limited to turnout and voter preference, some interviewers ask voters how long they stood in
line. See R. Claassen, D. Magleby, Q. Monson, K. Patterson,
“ ‘At Your Service’: Voter Evaluations of Poll Worker Performance,” American Politics Research Vol. 36, No. 4 (2008), pp.
612-34; M. Alvarez, et al., supra note 5; R. M. Stein and G.
Vonnahme, M. Byrne, and D. Wallach, “Voting Technology,
Election Administration and Voter Performance,” Election Law
Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 2008),
pp. 123–35.
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serves the right of Congress to supersede state
laws regulating congressional elections.9 The result is a complex web of overlapping jurisdictions
and 10,071 government units that administer elections.10 To complicate matters further, authority
in all jurisdictions is ceded to two million poll
workers who control the success or failure of each
election.11
Our study contributes to the literature on elections
administration in two ways. First, we break down
the voting experience into a three-step Election Day
precinct place voting process that is common to all
jurisdictions regardless of local rules. Second, we
create reliable measures for the arrival rate of voters and the service time of the poll workers and voting machines, respectively. Using these measures,
we are better able to predict when voters will arrive
at the polls and to evaluate the efficiency of various
poll worker protocols and the effects of different
voting technology.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Lines form when the supply of a service cannot
meet the demand to be served. By increasing the efficiency of voting services, elections administrators
can decrease the likelihood of lines forming at
polling stations during an election. Unfortunately,
elections administrators do not often think of polling
stations as operation centers and much of the research on elections treats the polling station as a
black box. Operations research is not prominent in
the election literature, although it is extensively employed in the private sector when businesses are
looking for ways to boost efficiency or cut costs.
More specifically, firms apply the methods of queuing theory to study the efficiency of assembly line
production, computer processors, and customer-oriented services.12
This study makes a case for applying operations
research to elections and illustrates how to use the
framework of queuing theory to improve the voting
process.
Lines and operations
Our study relies on the basic assumption of queuing theory that lines form when the rate of service
being provided cannot keep pace with arrivals. In

every polling station, two services are provided:
identity verification and balloting. Thus, we analyze
the voting process in three steps: 1) arrival at the
polling station, 2) check-in and identity verification
(what we call Service One), and 3) balloting (what
we call Service Two). Figure 1 illustrates this process.
Congestion at a polling station will occur for either of two reasons. In the first case, a line will
form when Service One cannot keep pace with arrivals (Service One ! Arrivals). For example, if
there is only one poll worker checking a voter’s
identification and registration, and she can only
serve three voters per minute, then a line will form
if four or more people arrive each minute. In the
second case, a line will form when Service Two
cannot keep pace with the flow of traffic into the
voting booth (Service Two ! Arrivals ! Service
One). For example, if three voters arrive and have
their registration verified each minute, but upon
leaving the check-in table find only one available
voting machine that requires four minutes to use, a
voter backup will ensue.
To date, the research that examines polling station operation and congestion has not evaluated
how the distribution of voter arrivals interacts with
the rate of poll worker service and the time a voter
stands in the voting booth. In the two most prominent articles on polling station congestion, the au-

9

Art. I, sec. 4 of the United States Constitution reads: “The
Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations . . . ”
10 Election Data Services, “2008 Voting Equipment Report,
Washington, D.C. (2008), http://www.electiondataservices.com/
images/File/NR_VoteEquip_Nov-2008wAppendix2.pdf.
11 See “Helping Americans Vote: Poll Workers,” Election
line.org Briefing, Pew Center on the States (September 2007),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/ERIP
Brief19_final.pdf.
12 For example, in 1997, IBM teamed with Air Canada to apply queuing models to decrease customer wait times for preflight services like check-in, security checks, and boarding.
They developed a model that allowed Air Canada to run various “what if” simulations. Thus, Air Canada could project the
performance outcomes of different resource allocations, such
as changing the number of customer service agents or introducing electronic check-in machines. See J. L. Snowdon et al.,
“IBM Journey Management Library: An Arena System for Airport Simulations,” The Journal of the Operational Research Society 51, no. 4 (2000), pp. 449–56.
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FIG. 1.

Three steps of the voting process.

thors focus on the 2004 presidential election in
Franklin County, Ohio, where people reported
waiting in line up to three hours to vote. In both
articles, the authors rely on assumptions about
polling place activity to estimate line lengths using proxies related solely to voting equipment.
Highton relies on voting machine allocation as a
proxy for variation in line length.13 Allen and
Bernshteyn use both machine allocation and ballot
length as proxies for line length and also point to
after-hours service at polling stations as evidence
that long lines persisted throughout the day.14
These articles illustrate how various administrative
decisions can negatively affect voter participation.
Indeed, both articles estimate that more than
20,000 people failed to vote in Franklin County because of long lines.
A more recent report by Edelstein employs
a simulative queuing model, again based on voting equipment, to estimate the distribution of
average wait times during an election.15 Edelstein artificially manipulates the input of voter arrivals, assuming that the rate of arrivals doubles
for a one hour period in the morning, during the
lunch hour, and at the end of the day. Edelstein
simulates 10,000 elections to generate a series of
graphs of peak wait times based on various scenarios of voting machine allocation and ballot
completion rates. These models are a welcome
contribution to the field of election operations, and
the graphs are a good example of how information about the process might help voters to make
an informed decision about when to go to the
polls.
Like the two previous articles, however, Edelstein
was unable to link his theoretical model to actual

Election Day circumstances and voter behavior. For
example, the focus on voting machines and ballot
lengths fails to account for variation in the first service provided to voters at the check-in table and its
effect on line length. In addition, the distribution of
voter arrivals is based on an assumption of randomness or other untested hypotheses about voter
behavior. In contrast, our study aims to both broaden
the scope of observation and to use observational
data to test general assumptions about voter behavior.
Our goal in designing this study is to bring actual
data related to the operation of polling stations to
bear on these models and to identify not just when
a line may form, but exactly where and why the process breaks down. Every election jurisdiction runs
its elections differently; thus, our study is by no
means a comprehensive analysis of this issue, nor
can it be universally applied. However, we believe
that our dataset is valuable in that it describes actual, observed processes that underlie how polling
places operate.

13

B. Highton, “Long Lines, Voting Machine Availability, and
Turnout: The Case of Franklin County, Ohio in the 2004 Presidential Election,” PS: Political Science and Politics Vol. 39,
No. 1 (2006), pp. 65–68. See also J. Knapp, “Effect of VotingMachine Allocations on the 2004 Election—Franklin County,
Ohio,” (2009), http://coolohio.com/machinery/.
14 T. Allen and M. Bernshteyn, “Mitigating Voter Waiting
Times,” Chance Vol. 19, no. 4 (2006), pp. 25–36.
15 W. A. Edelstein, “New Voting Systems for NY—Long Lines
and High Cost “ New Yorkers for Verified Voting (2006), available at: http://www.nyvv.org/voterlines.shtml. See also W. A.
Edelstein and A. D. Edelstein, “Touchscreen Voting Machines
Cause Long Lines and Disenfranchise Voters,” (2008),
http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.5577.
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STUDY DESIGN
Setting
California is home to 12% of the country’s registered voters. Each of California’s 58 counties
trains its own poll workers and selects its own voting system. In 2007, California Secretary of State
Debra Bowen conducted a “top-to-bottom review”
of the state’s voting systems and withdrew her approval for the use of several voting machine models, most notably touch-screen direct recording
electronic (DRE) machines, whose manufacturers
had failed to meet the Secretary’s published standards.16 As a result, four voting systems were used
in California during the 2008 primary election:
(1) non-touch-screen DRE machines manufactured
by Hart Intercivic; (2) paper ballots with precinctbased optical scanners; (3) paper ballots with centrally located optical scanners; and (4) the
“InkaVote Plus” hybrid precinct-central scanner
with security ink marker.17 The Hart Intercivic
DRE machine, called an eSlate, was used by Orange and San Mateo counties and required voters
to spin a rotary “SELECT Wheel”—much like an
iPod track wheel—to scroll through the on-screen
selections. Twenty-eight counties used precinctbased optical scanners, twenty-four counties used
centrally-located optical scanners, and Los Angeles county used the one-of-a-kind InkaVote hybrid
scanner system where ballots are scanned at the
precinct to verify they have been filled out correctly, then re-scanned at a central location where
the individual votes are tallied.18
Any registered voter in California may alternatively request to vote absentee. California is one of
just five states that allow permanent no-excuse absentee voting, meaning any registered voter may request to receive an absentee ballot automatically for
all future elections. Absentee voters, whether permanent or for the particular election only, receive a
ballot in the mail several weeks before an election
and have the option of either mailing their ballot to
the registrar’s office—postmarked on or before
Election Day—or dropping their absentee ballot off
at any polling station in their county. In the 2008
primary election, nearly 42% of all votes were cast
by absentee ballot.19
The variation in voting systems between counties provides a natural setting for our study. On

February 5, 2008, we dispatched 119 data collectors to monitor the flow of voter traffic at 30
polling stations—10 polling stations in each of
three neighboring Bay Area counties. Each county
employed different voting technology: Alameda
County voters submitted paper ballots into optical
scanners at each polling station, San Mateo County
voters used the Hart Intercivic eSlate DRE machine, and Napa County voters cast paper ballots
that were collected and later scanned at a central
location. We did not study voting locations using
the InkaVote system.
Selection
California’s 58 counties are comprised of
25,090 precincts. Our sample of 10 polling stations
in each county allows us to observe small effects
among the variables across counties.20 The 30
polling stations were selected in geographic clusters that were stratified by income. The decision
to organize our sample into clusters rather than
strict randomization was purely economical. The
clusters were arranged such that the support van
could make a stop at each polling station in less
than an hour. We stratified our precincts by income
to produce an adequate sample of lower income
communities in Napa and San Mateo counties and
then randomly chose precincts within these strata
that were representative of different income lev-

16

“Top-to-Bottom Review,” California Secretary of State website, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm. Despite
their decertification, Secretary Bowen allowed 14 counties to
use Premier (formerly Diebold) AccuVote touch-screen DRE
machines as their state-mandated disability-accessible voting
machine.
17 “Voting Systems Used by Counties,” California Secretary of
State website, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/
systemsinuse_110606.pdf.
18 As the nation’s largest voting jurisdiction, Los Angeles has
a special contract with Election Systems & Software, Inc.
(ES&S) as the only consumer of the InkaVote Plus system, serving Los Angeles county voters since 2003.
19 See “Voter Participation Statistics by County,” in Statement
of Vote—February 2008 Primary Election, California Secretary
of State’s Office, 2008, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2008_primary/contents.htm.
20 The assumptions that motivated our power analysis—using
Cohen’s effect size conventions—proved to be conservative.
We underestimated the overwhelming turnout that occurred on
February 5th, an error that strengthened the robustness of our
data.
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Data collection.

els.21 The result is a binary variable—“high income” and “low income”—where “high income”
is defined as median household income greater
than or equal to California’s three-year-average
median household income of $55,864.22
The geographic clusters and the income strata did
not perfectly overlap. Thus, each geographic cluster contained at least one “high income” and at least
one “low income” polling station. As far as feasible, we selected polling stations within each geographic cluster that represented the heterogeneity
that existed in the county as a whole.
Data collection
The study was structured to record: 1) the arrival
rate of voters, 2) the attrition rate of the line, 3) the
rate of Service One, 4) the rate of Service Two, and
5) general poll worker characteristics.
Our design called for two data collectors. See Figure 2. The first data collector recorded the arrival of
voters in ten-minute intervals from the opening of
the polls at 7:00 a.m. to their close at 8:00 p.m. We
noted the arrival of 11,858 people. In addition, we
recorded the number of people that reneged.
“Reneging” is the technical term for a person who
arrived, stood in line, and then left without immediately voting. The data collectors were instructed
to mark all those people who got out of line as a
“renege” unless they were absolutely sure that they
got back into line. In our sample, 225 people reneged (1.89% of all arrivals).

The second data collector noted the exact time in
seconds that every fifth voter made contact with the
poll workers at the check-in table, physically left the
check-in table, physically arrived at the voting booth
or station, and physically left the voting booth or
station. In Alameda County, the time was noted
when the voter scanned his or her ballot. Thus, we
were able to calculate the service times for 2,160
voters.
Our data gatherers also administered a short questionnaire to 153 poll workers, or 89% of all observed
poll workers, with simple demographic and poll
worker history information.23 This allowed us to
link the characteristics of each poll worker to the
voters they assisted and, thus, to measure the effects
of a poll worker’s age, race, sex, income level, em-

21

Because Napa County has both a significantly higher median
income and, more interestingly, a significantly more polarized
income distribution than either of the other two counties, we
were careful to prevent this from driving our results.
22 The 3-year-average was calculated from 2005–2007, in current 2007 dollars, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.
“Three-Year-Average Median Household Income by State:
2005–2007,” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).
23 We asked the following eight multiple choice questions in
the survey: (1) Are you male or female?; (2) Which of the following age groups do you fit into?; (3) Including today, how
many times have you worked as an election official?; (4) What
is your current occupational status?; (5) What is the highest
level of education you have completed?; (6) Do you live in the
precinct of this polling place you are stationed at?; (7) What is
your current marital status?; (8) What is your race?
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FIG. 3. Distribution of arrivals. This figure previously appeared in “Data for Democracy: Improving Elections Through Metrics and Measurement,” Pew Center on the States, Washington, D.C. (2008), p. 5, used with permission.

ployment status, education level, and experience on
his rate of service.
FINDINGS
Our study yielded data on the arrival rate of voters, the number of minutes voters spent at Service
One and the number of minutes voters spent at Service Two. We also observed actual line lengths and
attrition. These data shed some light on the processes inside the walls of a polling place.
Voter arrivals
Unsurprisingly, we found that voter arrivals are
not randomly distributed across the day. Knowledge
about the flow of traffic is significant for local election officials attempting to make allocation decisions. Admittedly, the supply of some resources,
such as voting machines, cannot realistically be adjusted during the day, but other resources, such as
poll workers, could be. Most officials look to general data on turnout when allocating resources for
Election Day, but there are few data quantifying
when voters actually arrive throughout the day.24
Figure 3 shows the density function for the number
of arrivals in our sample.
The uniformity we observed both within and
between counties suggests that the arrival rate of
voters may be predictable. This is not to say that all
jurisdictions would see this same double-humped
pattern; however, some discernible pattern is likely.25

In our sample, voters arrived in about the same
distribution: a small surge during the first hour of
operation, a noticeable dip during the lunchtime
hours of 12:00–2:00 p.m., and then a wave of voters (!150% increase) between 5:00–7:00 p.m. Arrivals sharply declined after 7:00 p.m. and only
3% of voters cast a ballot in the final 30 minutes of
the day.
Although consistent with expectations, our more
precise information is useful for a number of rea-

24

In 2006, Maryland used electronic poll books to track the
time people checked in at the registration table. These data are
somewhat different from an arrival rate as they do not account
for voters who arrive when there is a queue, only tallying voters once they reach the check-in table. See Dan Seligson, “How
Data Has Improved Election Management,” in Data For
Democracy, Pew Center on the States, Washington, DC (2008),
p. 5.
25 We are cautious about the external validity of our findings;
anecdotal reports from Florida during the November 2008 general election suggest that lines were consistently longer in the
early morning hours, but consistently very short in the late afternoon and evening. Parts of Florida, of course, contain large
numbers of retirees. There is evidence that voters in other jurisdictions arrive in a pattern quite similar to what we observed.
See, for example, K. Dow, “Study of Voter Flow at the 2006
General Election, Columbia County, NY,” New Yorkers for
Verified Voting (2007), http://tinyurl.com/Dow-Voter-Flowpdf; D. Magleby and H. Christensen. “When People Vote and
What Difference It Makes.” Prepared for presentation at the
Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, New York, New York, September 1-4, 1994 (Figures 1
and 2); D. Fuchs and J. Becker, “A Brief Report on the Time
of Day When People Vote,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 32,
No. 3 (1968), pp. 437–40 (Table 1).
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sons.26 For example, armed with the knowledge that
more than 25% of all voters arrive between
5:00–7:00 p.m., local election officials might establish a policy that encourages poll workers to take
their dinner break before or after the evening rush
or allocate more poll workers to stressed precincts
in those evening hours. In polling stations that use
paper ballots or in small locations, such as someone’s garage, election officials might also instruct
poll workers to reduce the number of privacy booths
during the middle of the day, when the arrival rate
is lowest. These privacy booths are relatively simple to collapse and in polling stations where voters
are standing shoulder to shoulder, creating more
space would allow them to move around more freely
and allow for greater voter privacy.
Data on voter arrivals are simple to capture and
highly useful. We hope our example will prompt
scholars and elections officials alike to gather such
data.
Service One
Service One includes all of the activities that
occur at the check-in table such as checking ID,
looking up the voter’s name in the voter registration book, and producing a ballot or voting
card. These tasks aim to verify the voter’s identity
and provide him or her with either a voting card
for a direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machine or a blank paper ballot. The most important
independent variable in Service One is the poll
worker. Whatever affects the performance of a poll
worker should have a measurable effect on the efficiency of Service One and thus the voting process at large.
Table 1 shows the results of a multivariate regression that models the Check-in Service Time of
voters in our sample on a host of operational and
social variables. The reported standard errors are robust standard errors, clustered by polling station.
The first variable in the table is a dummy variable
that shows if the poll worker that served the voter
at the check-in table was over 55 years old. The second variable is a dummy variable that shows if the
poll worker that serves the voter is an experienced
poll worker. In order to show robust significance,
we also include an interaction variable between age
and experience. Because earlier studies have shown
that older poll workers are generally less comfortable with DRE machines than younger poll work-
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ers, we include an interaction variable between age
and the San Mateo County dummy variable to account for the possibility that this discomfort would
be driving a resultant slower service time.27 We do
not include an interaction between the San Mateo
dummy and experience. This election was the first
time San Mateo County used these voting machines,
so any interaction between these dummies would be
coincidental.28
Several of our early assumptions were confirmed
by our data. With a check-in baseline of 1 minute
50 seconds, voters who later cast their ballots using
a voting machine reserved for disabled voters re-

26

Information about voter arrivals may be important for political reasons. For example Republican strategist Karl Rove complained that 15,000 voters were deterred from voting in
Florida’s panhandle in 2000 after several network news programs called the election for Al Gore ten minutes before the
polls closed. See K. Jamieson and P. Waldman, eds., Electing
the President, 2000: The Insiders’ View, Philadelphia: Univ. of
Pennsylvania Press, (2001), p. 232. Rove was convinced that a
large percentage of voters procrastinated until the final hour before going to the polls. Our data suggest that that may not have
been the case. See, however, Crespin, M. and R. Vander Wielen. “The Influence of Media Projections on Voter Turnout In
Presidential Elections from 1980–2000,” Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, April 25–28, 2002, crespin.myweb.uga.
edu/Mediaresubmission.pdf; M. Delli Carpini, “Scooping the
Voters? The Consequences of the Networks Early Call of the
1980 Presidential Race,” Journal of Politics Vol. 46, No. 3
(1984), pp. 866–85, for evidence of depressed turnout when
media projections are substantially early, i.e. two or more hours
before the polls close.
27 Initial assessments have found that poll workers are not particularly confident in their ability to avoid mistakes. A post-primary survey of poll workers in Cuyahoga County, Ohio found
that only 42 percent were satisfied with their own performance
on election day. See K. Frakas, “Study: Poll Workers, Not Machines, Build Voter Confidence,” The Plain Dealer, Cleveland
(February 21 2007). Hall, Monson and Patterson observe that
poll workers over the age of 55 were significantly more likely
to have start-up or shut-down problems with electronic machines than younger poll workers. T. Hall, Q. Monson, and K.
Patterson, “Poll Workers and the Vitality of Democracy: An
Early Assessment,” PS: Political Science and Politics Vol. 40,
No. 4 (2007), pp. 647–54. See also M. Alvarez, M. Llewellyn,
and T. Hall, “Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are
Counted?,” Working Paper No. 49, Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (2006).
28 The county dummy variables act as proxies for voting machine technology. It is certainly possible that this could be picking up other variation between the counties, but each regression includes local demographic characteristics, such as
population density, education, and family income, as well as
election characteristics, such as arrival rate, provisional balloting, and absentee drop-offs to control for alternative explanations for the variation.
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TABLE 1.

MODEL

OF

FACTORS AFFECTING SERVICE ONE
Robust SE,
clustered by
polling station

p # "t"

Variable

Coeff.

Poll worker is over 55 years old
Poll worker has experience
Disabled voter
Absentee
Provisional
% of voting age population
African American
Hispanic or Asian
Median household income (per $10k)
Alameda County dummy
San Mateo County dummy
Interaction of age and experience
Interaction of age and San Mateo dummy

$0.108
0.518
0.711
$0.902
1.778

0.187
0.256
0.169
0.371
0.447

0.570
0.054
0.000
0.023
0.001

$0.038
0.008
$0.185
0.959
0.587
$0.122
$0.466

0.012
0.006
0.031
0.420
0.385
0.273
0.253

0.003
0.743
0.000
0.032
0.140
0.657
0.078

1.839
0.178
1,420

0.399

0.000

Constant
R2
N

Other non-statistically significant control variables in the model:
• Voter experienced ballot error later
• San Mateo voter opted for paper ballot
• Percent of population with bachelor’s degree or higher
• Population density
• Number of people arriving
• Number of people reneging
• Number of poll workers at the check-in table
• Number of people standing in line at the check-in table
• Number of voting stations/privacy booth set up for use.

quired 43 more seconds of the poll worker’s time.29
Voters who cast provisional ballots were at the table
twice as long as traditional voters—an additional
one minute and forty-seven seconds—while absentee voters stood at the table for half the time of traditional voters—a total of fifty-six seconds.30 There
was a significant increase in poll worker efficiency
at polling stations in high-income neighborhoods.
For each additional $10,000 of median household
income in the Census block group most closely
aligned to the precinct, voters could expect to stand
at the check-in table for eleven fewer seconds. Thus,
some voters in neighborhoods of Napa County
where median household income is $46,000 experienced an average service time at the check-in table
that was two full minutes longer than voters in other
neighborhoods of Napa County where median
household income exceeds $200,000.
Two findings surprised us and were completely
contrary to our a priori hypotheses. First, experienced poll workers were not more efficient, even
when we controlled for age. To the contrary, the ser-

vice time of poll workers with experience during at
least one prior election was correlated with an extra thirty-one seconds of voter check-in time.31 With
all of the changing rules and regulations between
elections, it may be the case that poll workers with
experience are more likely to become confused
about applying a rule that has changed several times.
It may also be the case that experienced poll workers are more relaxed and likely to visit with voters
whom they have served over the past several
29

Our data collectors were instructed to check a box when a
voter used the voting machine reserved for disabled voters. We
did not record whether (or how) individual voters were disabled. Because some non-disabled voters also used the voting
equipment reserved for the disabled, our results likely underestimate the effect of disabled voters on the process.
30 In California, absentee voters are able to fill out their ballot
at home and drop it off at any polling place in the county where
they are registered.
31 This finding fell just outside the conventional 0.05 alpha level
(p " 0.054). Thus, at the very least, we cannot reject the counterintuitive hypothesis that experienced poll workers are less
efficient.
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years.32 Both of these explanations appear plausible
and further research is warranted to determine what
factors may be driving our finding.
Second, we found that the number of poll workers at the service table is positively correlated to the
length of the lines that we observed. In other words,
when there were more poll workers at the check-in
table, lines were longer. There is almost certainly
some level of simultaneity between the variables and
so we are uncertain whether additional poll workers
get in each other’s way or, if upon seeing a long line
forming, additional poll workers run to the table to
help their co-workers.33 In our model, additional poll
workers did not make the process any more efficient.
Thus, regardless of why additional poll workers are
positively correlated to a longer line, extra human
capital may not be the most efficient solution to the
operational problem of long lines. One possible explanation is that poll workers are poorly trained; researchers and policymakers have recently evaluated
poll worker training programs as a way to assess poll
worker efficiency. For example, the Election Assistance Commission created a briefing book of “best
practices” for poll worker training based on surveys
they conducted of local election officials throughout
the United States.34
Perhaps a more realistic explanation of the surprising reverse correlation between the number of
workers and quick check-in is that poll worker inefficiency results from a system design failure. In a
polling station, the tasks at the check-in table are
very simple and not well suited to many operators.
For example, it only takes one person to scan for a
voter’s name on an alphabetized list of registered
voters. Thus, an additional poll worker may actually hinder the process.
In essence, local officials face two distinct poll
worker problems: a managerial separation between
supervisor and employee and an institutional knowledge gap between skilled and unskilled poll workers. Election officials oversee an institution with history and rules governing its operation, but lack the
time to devote to long-term training. Poll workers,
on the other hand, are not polling place specialists
ready to complete discrete and specialized tasks, but
are often untrained or poorly-trained workers. Election officials and academics are aware that this is
the case, yet they lack the data necessary to evaluate its effect on poll worker consistency and efficiency. Our study provides an introductory analysis
of these effects. Nonetheless, additional research
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should be conducted to explore the full extent of this
difficult problem.
Service Two
The second stage in the voting process is a voting platform that allows voters to interact with the
ballot. Service Two incorporates the length and design of ballots, the design and model of a voting
machine, and the number of voting machines or
privacy booths in use. For every voter, a unique
ballot is marked, verified, and tabulated. Different
voting technologies combine these processes in different ways. For example, most voters in the United
States mark a paper ballot that they feed into an
electronic optical scanner. This scanner combines
the process of verification and tabulation. In a
growing number of jurisdictions, voters use direct
recording electronic (DRE) machines that combine
ballot marking, verification, and tabulation all into
one act.35

32

Poll workers in Utah and Ohio reported that “being with people I enjoy” was the third most important motivating factor for
their service (behind “doing my share” and “it is my civic
duty”). See D. Magleby, Q. Monson and K. Patterson, “Evaluating the Quality of the Voting Experience: A Cross Panel Pilot Study of the November 7, 2006 Election in Franklin County,
OH, Summit County, OH and the State of Utah.” Center for
the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University (2008), http://csed.byu.edu/ (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “By Year” hyperlink).
33 We regressed line length on the number of poll workers at
the check in table, controlling for service time, county effects,
poll worker demographic effects, arrival and reneging rates only
to find a 0.095 positive correlation (p ! 0.05). Yet when we
reversed the two variables of interest—regressing number of
poll workers on line length and the host of other variables—we
saw a similar 0.036 positive correlation (p ! 0.025).
34 See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, “Successful Practices for Poll Worker Recruitment, Training and Retention”,
Washington, D.C. (2007); See also S. Mockabee, Q. Monson,
and K. Patterson, “Evaluating on-Line Training: A Study of
Poll Worker Training in Butler and Delaware Counties, Ohio
for the March 4, 2008 Presidential Primary Election,” Center
for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University, forthcoming, Pew Center on the States (2009).
35 In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election in Florida,
the United States Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act
which, inter alia, requires states to replace old voting systems
(specifically the problematic punch card system) with new,
electronic voting machines that allow voters to verify their ballot before it is officially counted. The result has been a nationwide trend toward optical scanners and DRE machines. In 2000,
41.9% of registered voters lived in a county that used either an
optical scanner or DRE machine. See “Voting Equipment
Summary by Type as of 11/07/2000,” Election Data Services,
(2004). In 2008, that number increased to 88.8%. See “2008
Voting Equipment Study,” supra note 11.
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TABLE 2.

San Mateo
Alameda
Difference

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCENT

OF

BALLOTS CAST

Total
Ballots
Cast

In Precinct
on Election
Day

Major Party
Presidential
Candidate

Prop
91

Prop
92

Prop
93

Prop
94

Prop
95

Prop
96

Prop
97

211,697
428,930

54.24
51.48

82.24
81.21
$0.97%

89.24
89.57
$0.33%

92.02
92.24
$0.22%

93.65
93.12
0.53%

94.63
94.28
0.35%

94.61
94.18
0.43%

94.26
94.12
0.14%

94.26
93.70
$0.56%

Source: Alameda and San Mateo Registrars of Voters’ websites, 2008.

Voting technology is our key independent variable on waiting times. Each county we observed employed a different voting technology. In Alameda
County voters used paper ballots (“complete the arrow”) that were scanned at each polling station.
Napa County also used paper ballots, but stored
them to scan at a central location at the end of Election Day. San Mateo County used DRE machines
manufactured by Hart Intercivic.
Voters in Napa County spent the fewest minutes
casting their ballots—about three minutes in the voting booth. Voters in Alameda County spent three
minutes and twenty-five seconds in the voting booth
while voters in San Mateo County spent approximately four minutes and thirty seconds each to complete their ballot, controlling for ballot length.36
How much is the technology itself the cause of
these differences? Possible explanations include
the tendency to cast an incomplete paper ballot, the
length of the ballot, and the various socio-economic characteristics that differ by precinct and by
county.
Incomplete Ballots. One possible explanation
for why DRE machines could take longer to use is
that DRE users voted for more ballot issues than paper ballot voters. When a voter using a paper ballot
decides to skip one or two measures, he or she can
still submit the ballot to the scanner without incident. On a DRE machine, if a voter decides to skip
a measure, he or she will be reminded that the ballot is incomplete and given the opportunity (with
the press of a button) to go back and complete the
ballot. Therefore, casting a complete ballot on a
DRE is simpler for the voter and takes less time.
One possible explanation for longer vote times at
DRE machines, therefore, may be that a larger ratio of voters cast a complete ballot than those who
vote via paper ballots. If true, the observed inefficiency of the DRE machines may be justified to the

extent one regards avoiding drop-off as desirable.
However, we did not observe a disparity in ballot
completion rates between counties.
The biggest difference between precincts is the
percent of ballots cast for major party presidential
candidates. This entire difference can be explained
by the fact that voters in Alameda County were more
than four times as likely to vote for Green Party candidate Cynthia McKinney and twice as likely to vote
for a Libertarian candidate than voters in the other
two counties. Among the seven state ballot initiatives, there was less than 1% difference in votes cast
between the counties and, contrary to the above hypothesis, three of the seven ballot propositions saw
a higher overall percent of votes among paper ballot voters in Alameda County than among voters
using a DRE machine in San Mateo County. See
Table 2.
Thus, it does not appear to be the case that ballot completion rates are driving the difference in service times.
Socio-Economic Status Effect. In addition to
mechanical differences between counties, demographic dissimilarities may be a good predictor of
how long it takes to vote and provide a better sense
of the contributing effect of voting technology. For
each of our 30 monitored precincts, we gathered
Census data on precinct-level median household income, percent with a bachelor’s degree or more,
population density, and the percent of voting age
population that is African American, Hispanic, and
Asian. Furthermore, we know the sex of each voter
in our sample and whether he or she used voting

36

We controlled for ballot length in two ways. First, we held
constant the number of race and ballot propositions. Second,
we held constant the number of words on each ballot (including instructions). Our findings were the same using either
method.
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TABLE 3.

MODEL

OF

FACTORS AFFECTING SERVICE TWO

Coeff.

Robust SE
clustered by
polling station

p # "t"

(dropped)
1.668
$0.130
0.002
0.022
$0.040

0.471
0.166
0.014
0.066
0.062

0.002
0.442
0.903
0.740
0.523

Voter experienced machine error
Male or female
Voter used disabled voting equipment
Voter cast a provisional ballot
Voter cast a paper ballot in San Mateo

0.702
$0.025
1.835
1.269
$2.799

0.946
0.149
3.117
0.330
0.201

0.465
0.870
0.561
0.001
0.000

Median household income ($10k)
% of precinct with BA degree or more
% voting age population
African American
Hispanic or Asian
Population density (per sq. km.)

$0.048
0.013

0.052
0.007

0.360
0.071

0.035
$0.005
$0.027

0.019
0.010
0.074

0.073
0.596
0.714

3.691
0.111
1,485

0.660

0.000

Variable
Alameda dummy
San Mateo dummy
Ballot length
Arrival rate
Number of poll workers
Number of privacy booths (or DRE machines)

Constant
R2
N

equipment reserved for the disabled. We added several mechanical control variables such as machine
errors, provisional ballots, arrival rate, number of
poll workers, number of voting booths, San Mateo
voters that used paper, and controlled for ballot
length in order to analyze the effect of these operational and socio-economic factors on voting time.
See Table 3. In order to account for possible variation caused by a mixture of data from distinct units
of analysis, we report robust standard errors that are
clustered by each polling station.
None of the socio-economic characteristics themselves have a significant effect. However, the cluster of polling stations in neighborhoods that exceeded California’s median household income saw
voters cast their ballots on average 32 seconds faster
than those who live in neighborhoods that fell below California’s median household income of
$55,864, regardless of the voting technology.
After controlling for 14 operational and social
variables, including ballot length, voters who used
a DRE took on average one minute forty seconds or
45% longer to vote than voters using paper ballots.
Thus, it is likely that the technology of the voting
machine itself explains much of the variation in voting times. To test this hypothesis, we compared

DRE voters in San Mateo with their in-county peers
who opted to use paper ballots. On average, DRE
voters spent two minutes forty-eight seconds or 76%
longer to cast their ballots than their paper ballot
counterparts. The difference is so distinct that even
with a small sample (n " 34), the significance was
very high (p ! .001).
This finding is important inasmuch as DRE machines are significantly more expensive than paper
ballot printing costs and privacy booths, a fact that
may lead to fewer stations being available for voters in DRE jurisdictions.37 Thus, not only might it
take longer to use a DRE machine, but there may
be fewer of them available, compared to privacy
booths for paper ballot voters. In this case, a
polling station that employs DRE voting machines
would be more likely to see a line form on Election Day.

37

In extreme cases, the cost of DRE machines is so high that
states are forced to consolidate precincts and yet still face a
shortage of voting stations on Election Day. The implications
of this downsizing was apparent in Utah County during the 2008
primary election where 107 precincts were consolidated into
59. See M. Rigert, “Long Waits at the Polls Mark Election,”
Daily Herald, February 7, 2008.
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FIG. 4.

Aggregate length of lines.

Line length
In addition to tallying arrivals, we counted the
number of people who were standing in line at the
end of each ten-minute interval throughout Election
Day. In queuing theory, lines are a product of incongruence between arrivals and service times. As
we noted above, the arrival of voters we observed
was not equally distributed across the day. The rates
of both Service One and Service Two, however,
were constant across the day; poll workers did not
pick up the pace as arrivals increased, nor did voters fill out their ballots more quickly when lines
started to form.
These findings suggest that there is a threshold of
arrivals beyond which the constant service rate in
our sample was inadequate. Although the individual lines that we observed were not particularly
long, our data reveal that lines were longest when
the rate of arrivals was at its peak, namely, between
5:00–7:00 p.m. Figure 4 represents the aggregate
line length of every polling station in our sample.38
Elections officials are likely to view this data favorably, and we applaud the registrars of voters and
poll workers in our sample. As concerned citizens,
we were quite relieved that we did not encounter
hours-long lines. Yet as researchers, this lack of long
lines prevents us from making any concrete normative claims about individual voter behavior. Despite
this, our data is important inasmuch as they confirm
the hypothesized correlation between voter arrivals
and line length, and because they provide baseline
information against which the existing research on

lines can be tested. Furthermore, analyzing line
length at the aggregate level is useful because we
can measure correlations between line length and
other variables, such as attrition.
Attrition
Our final data relate to the deterrent effect of
lines. In our sample of 11,858 arrivals, 225 people
(1.89%) “reneged.”39 Figure 5 illustrates the percentage who reneged, depending on the line length.
At the end of each 79 ten-minute interval during the
thirteen-hour Election Day, we noted the number of
people standing in line—anybody waiting to be
served by a poll worker, but not yet served. We
matched these 2,181 data points with our data on
reneging for each corresponding ten-minute interval.40 We then created a four-by-two frequency
table to calculate the rate of observed reneging in

38

The median line length in our sample was zero and the longest
line in any one polling station reached thirteen people. Only
fifty-one voters (of nearly 12,000) waited in line for more than
ten minutes.
39 We were unable to track people once they left the polling
station. Our data collectors were instructed to count an instance
of reneging if the person who left the line did not immediately
return. If a person left the line and was gone for several hours,
our data collectors likely did not remember him. Thus, such
people were tallied as having arrived twice and reneged once.
40 We excluded data for one polling station where several different lines formed (and overlapped) for access to different
precinct tables because we were not confident in the accuracy
of the data. We also excluded 14 data points from another
polling station where our observers failed to record these data.
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each of three categories—from less crowded to
more crowded—where 0 " nobody got out of line,
and 1 " at least one person got out of line and did
not immediately vote. Each data point in Figure 5
represents the percentage of cases in each “crowdedness” category where reneging " 1. Because there
were no systemic problems causing long lines in our
sample, the number of observations is heavily
skewed towards zero. Three-fourths (or 1,616) of
our data points, in fact, occur where line length "
0. Of the remaining one-fourth of our data points,
24.5% occur when lines were between one and five
people long. There are 31 data points (1.49%) when
lines were between 6 and 10 people long, and only
three ten-minute intervals (0.1%) where line lengths
exceeded 10 people (with a maximum of 13).
Figure 5 plots the observed rate of reneging in
our sample. We see a positive correlation between
line length and the likelihood of reneging. This unsurprising observation confirms the conventional
wisdom about voter behavior in these circumstances.
Because of our unevenly distributed sample, the
data points in the first two categories are statistically significantly different—marked by black dots
and a solid line—while the data points in the third
category is not—marked by a white dot and a dotted line. More research on this topic is warranted.
With more information from a sample with a wider
range of line lengths, we would be able to evaluate
this observed correlation between line length and
reneging in more detail and with more confidence.

Whether or not the rate of reneging is related to
polling station operation variables, the fact that
1.89% of arrivals reneged is, in itself, noteworthy.
A handful of recent, closely watched elections were
decided by a fraction of a percent. For example, the
2008 Minnesota Senate race, the 2004 Washington
gubernatorial race, and the 2000 presidential race in
Florida were all decided by 0.01% or less. Presuming that some, or even many of the 1.89% of our
sample that reneged returned to vote later in the day,
and presuming that the rate of reneging is equally
distributed between political parties (there is no reason to believe otherwise), our observation is still
cause for concern. Reneging is important both as a
measure of the internalized cost of standing in line
as well as because it may affect turnout and election results.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our study suggests that there is predictable variation in each of the three stages of voting and our
models identify key variables for improving the efficiency of polling station operations. We recognize
the limitations on our data and caution against extrapolating from our findings. Elections vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from election year to
election year and our study is limited to three counties in one single state during one single primary
election; we do not measure the effect of voter ID
laws on the check-in process; we do not measure
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Probability that voters reneged.
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the effect of early voting on turnout; and our sample is limited to a model of DRE machine that represents just 20% of the DRE market.
However this article does paint an introductory
picture of operation inside a polling station’s black
box and illustrates the need for further and more extensive data collection if we are going to have any
idea how the process actually works. Our initial systematic look at the inner workings of the polling
place highlights the importance of evaluating
polling station operations as a three-step process:
voter arrivals and a series of two services. The bulk
of research on lines focuses on the voting machine,
and how their poor allocation may be correlated with
depressed turnout. This research fails to account for
the very important step—and potential bottleneck—
of “checking in” and any systemic problems that
may exist there. Our study finds that it is a critical
component of any such research.
In addition, we have collected the most comprehensive data to date on the operations and inner
workings of the polling place. Post election survey
questions related to voting are typically unspecific
about the process and in any event rely on voter recall. They therefore lead to unreliable responses. For
example, the question “how long did it take you to
vote” may elicit a response that relates to the time
a voter spent in the voting booth (Service Two), or
the time spent inside the polling station (Service One
% Service Two), or the time spent away from work
(Service One % Service Two % commute to and
from the polling place). Our goal was to improve
on earlier studies that either collected partial information or made assumptions about unobserved
voter behavior by filling in data gaps.
This study aims to be a bridge between the problem of long voting lines and cost-effective solutions. Despite recent advances in the field of election administration, from centralized voter
registration lists to electronic voting machines, the
process of voting is still largely evaluated against
anecdotes and assumptions. Our study brings new

data to bear on this process and also presents a
model for future data collection and analysis on the
operation of polling stations—America’s retail
outlets for democracy.
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